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Bernanke and Gertler’s inﬂuential 1999 article “Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy”
made the case that monetary policy should respond to asset prices only to the extent that they
have implications for future inﬂation. This paper revisits that prescription in light of the 2007–
09 ﬁnancial crisis. After reviewing the Bernanke-Gertler logic, the paper surveys the recent
evolution of views on the appropriate policy response to asset price ﬂuctuations, and discusses
theconditionsunderwhichaproactivepolicywouldbejustiﬁed. Thereisalmostnodiscernible
relationship between interest rates and stock and property prices across countries during the
years leading up to the crisis, however. While a theoretical case could be made to give some
weight to ﬁnancial stability in setting monetary policy, the evidence presented in the paper
suggests that incremental interest rate adjustments are unlikely to be effective in restraining
excessive asset price appreciation.
JEL codes: E52, E58, E44, G12
1 Introduction
Central banks have long struggled with the question of whether monetary policy should be used to
dampen asset price booms. On June 29, 2005, for example, two years before the mid-2007 house
price peak, members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) spent the
afternoon debating the merits of a monetary policy response to the ongoing housing boom. Similar
discussions took place during the great bull market of the mid-1990s amidst growing concerns
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1about unsustainably high stock prices. During the FOMC meeting of February 5, 1997, Alan
Greenspan articulated the Fed’s quandary of balancing ﬁnancial and macroeconomic objectives
when he remarked that “product prices alone should not be the sole criterion if we are going to
maintain a stable, viable ﬁnancial system...” while adding:
It is the real economy that matters. Finance is all very interesting and ﬁnancial prices
are quite important but only because they affect the real economy. Ultimately, that is
what our charter is all about.1
New York Fed president Benjamin Strong grappled with exactly the same set of issues seventy
years earlier during the stock market boom of the 1920s. Like Greenspan, Strong expressed mis-
givings about the stock market’s lofty valuation, but lacking any tangible signs of product price
inﬂation, resisted calls to tighten credit.2
Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999) seminal article “Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy,”
has framed much of the recent debate on the appropriate monetary policy response to asset price
ﬂuctuations. Its inﬂuence stems from its precise deﬁnition of the problem, and from the clarity
of its prescription: monetary policy should respond to the macroeconomic effects of asset price
ﬂuctuations, but not to the ﬂuctuations themselves:
The inﬂation-targeting approach dictates that central banks should adjust monetary
policy actively and pre-emptively to offset incipient inﬂationary or deﬂationary pres-
sures. Importantly, for present purposes, it also implies that policy should not respond
to changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inﬂation.3
While couched in terms of inﬂation targeting, which Bernanke and Gertler viewed as a reason-
able description of the Fed’s policy framework, the conclusions apply broadly to any central bank
seeking to minimize output and inﬂation volatility.
The 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis has understandably led to a reconsideration of the Bernanke-
Gertler (henceforth BG) conclusion. In hindsight, one cannot help but wonder whether a pre-
emptive policy of rate hikes might not have attenuated the housing bubble. This paper’s goal is to
summarize and critically re-examine the BG policy prescription in light of recent events. It begins
1From the transcript of the FOMC meeting of February 4-5 1997, p. 103.
2See Ahamed (2009), pp. 276–277.
3Bernanke & Gertler (1999, p. 18).
2in section 2 with a recapitulation of the main elements of the BG argument. Section 3 discusses
some of the ways in which views on the BG recommendation have evolved in light of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. Section 4 presents some new evidence on the relationship between interest rates and
the behavior of stock and real estate prices in the years preceding the ﬁnancial crisis. Section 5
concludes with an assessment of the BG recommendations, and the viability of alternative policy
options.
2 A review of the Bernanke-Gertler analysis
The core of the BG argument is the idea that “central banks should view price stability and ﬁnancial
stability as highly complementary and mutually consistent objectives.”4 This basic idea is neither
new nor farfetched. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that macroeconomic instability is good for
the ﬁnancial system.
The deleterious effects of inﬂation volatility are well understood. Unanticipated inﬂation re-
duces the value of long-dated assets, diminishing the net worth of those assets’ owners. As noted
by Brumbaugh et al. (1987), among others, this phenomenon was a major contributor to the U.S.
thrift crisis of the 1980s, in which high inﬂation and the accompanying high interest rates eroded
mortgage lenders’ capital base. Similarly, according to Fisher’s (1933) debt-deﬂation theory, unan-
ticipated deﬂation increases the real debt burden of debtors, creates ﬁnancial distress, and ampliﬁes
economic downturns.5
These views have been echoed by Schwartz (1995), who observed that price instability, and the
attendant variability in monetary policy, would lead to defaults:
[Borrowers and lenders] evaluate the prospects of projects by extrapolating the pre-
vailing price level or inﬂation rate. Borrowers default on loans not because they have
misled uninformed lenders but because, subsequent to the initiation of the project, au-
thorities have altered monetary policy in a contractionary direction. The original price
level and inﬂation rates are no longer valid. The change in monetary policy makes
rate-of-return calculations based on the yield of projects, based on the initial price
assumptions of both lenders and borrowers, unrealizable.6
4Bernanke & Gertler (1999, p. 18).
5Cargill et al. (1997), among others, argued that the decline in prices prolonged Japan’s banking crisis in the
mid-2000s, and this is one reason why some economists, including Bernanke (2000), called on the Bank of Japan to
adopt an inﬂation target.
6Schwartz (1995, p. 24).
3Figure 1: Retail prices and ﬁnancial crises in the UK, 1790–1870










Notes: Data are from Ofﬁcer (2010). Vertical lines mark the ﬁnancial panics
of 1793, 1797, 1811, 1825, 1836, 1847, 1857 and 1866.
The historical record generally supports the contention that price volatility breeds ﬁnancial
crises. Bordo & Wheelock (1998), for example, examined historical data from the U.S., the U.K.
and Canada, in an investigation of what they termed the “Schwartz Hypothesis,” after Schwartz
(1995). Their main ﬁnding was that ﬁnancial panics did tend to be associated with periods of high
price volatility. This pattern is evident in ﬁgure 1, which plots the level consumer prices in Great
Britain from the late 18th to the late 19th centuries. The major ﬁnancial panics, marked by the
vertical lines in the ﬁgure, often (but not always) follow periods of inﬂation, and precede episodes
of deﬂation.
It is important to emphasize that factors other than price volatility are often responsible for
ﬁnancial crises. Bordo and Wheelock observed that a number 19th and early 20th century U.S.
banking panics occurred during periods of price stability. The same can be said of the British
panics of 1793, 1836, and 1890. And indeed, the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis occurred in a global
environment of low and stable inﬂation. The inescapable conclusion is that while macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial stability may be complementary, macroeconomic stability does not gurantee ﬁnancial
stability.7
7Issing (2003) made a similar point. Conversely, examining the experience of a number of countries, Posen (2003)
42.1 A review of the Bernanke-Gertler model
The core of the BG analysis is based on what has become the canonical New Keynesian (NK)
macro model with the usual spending (“IS”) equation, a dynamic aggregate supply relationship,
and a policy rule specifying the central bank’s reaction to expected inﬂation and output. Because
asset prices do not appear explicitly in the standard NK model, Bernanke and Gertler augment the
model with wealth and “ﬁnancial accelerator” effects. These provide channels through which asset
market booms and busts could affect aggregate spending: the former by affecting consumption
spending, the latter by inﬂuencing the cost of external funds through collateral values.
Bubbles are modeled as realizations of an exogenous stochastic process. Each period, the bub-
ble continues to grow with probability p, and bursts with probability 1  p. The stock price is the
sum of the fundamental value, determined by the marginal product of capital, and the bubble term.
Asset prices affect aggregate consumption through households’ consumption spending, and ﬁrms’
investment expenditures. Bubbles are therefore essentially another source of aggregate demand
shocks, albeit one that follows a nonstandard statistical distribution.
It is also worth noting that in the BG framework, promoting ﬁnancial stability has nothing to
do with the prevention or attenuation of asset price bubbles, which are exogenous and unaffected
by interest rates. Instead, the role of monetary policy is to mitigate bubbles’ impact on aggregate
demand: appropriately calibrated rate hikes will limit the expansionary effects of asset price rises,
while rate cuts will cushion the blow when prices fall. This would be the appropriate policy
response to any demand shock, of course. What turns this into a model of ﬁnancial stability is the
inclusion of the ﬁnancial accelerator, which provides the primary mechanism through which asset
prices affect aggregate demand.
Monetary policy is modeled as a policy rule of the form
rn
t = ¯ rn+bEtpt+1+xSt 1=S ;
where St 1=S is the deviation of the stock price from its steady state value, and rn is the nominal
interest rate. The paper considers only a limited range of values for the two reaction function
concluded that a ﬁnancial crisis is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient condition for the occurrence of deﬂation.
5parameters: b values of 1.01 and 2.0 are used to represent accommodative and aggressive reactions
to inﬂation. The x stock price response is either zero or 0.1. The question of whether the central
bank should respond to asset prices boils down to whether the policy rule with x = 0:1 performs
better than the rule in which x = 0.
The quantitative criteria used to assess the policy rules’ performance are the unconditional
variances of output and inﬂation, which are obtained by simulating the model for alternative values





di[(pt+i  ¯ p)2+l(yt+i y)2] (1)
where y is the log of real GDP, y is potential output, p is the inﬂation rate, ¯ p is the inﬂation target,
d is a discount factor, and l is the weight attached to output ﬂuctuations relative to deviations of
the inﬂation rate from its target. This objective function, and particular the l parameter, is a useful
way to evaluate the tradeoffs between the (potentially conﬂicting) goals of output and inﬂation
stability. BG’s analysis of the alternative rules does not require using such an objective function,
however. The reason is that, in their model, asset price bubbles create no tradeoff between output
and inﬂation volatility: stabilizing inﬂation also stabilizes output, and vice versa.8
A critical assumption underlying the use of an objective function like 1, or BG’s simpler vari-
ance criterion, is that ﬁnancial instability has no economic costs in and of itself. Or to put it another
way, ﬁnancial crises affect economic well-being only to the extent that they create output or in-
ﬂation volatility. The BG prescription of responding only to bubbles’ impact on expected future
inﬂation therefore follows naturally from the model structure, and the criterion used to evaluate
alternative policy rules.
2.2 The key BG results
The baseline BG results appear in ﬁgure 2. Even without the inclusion of the stock price, the
results are striking: by responding exclusively to expected inﬂation, monetary policy is able to
stabilize inﬂation and output quite effectively. With an aggressive response to inﬂation, the bubble
causes only a mild increase in output. The inﬂation rate is virtually unchanged. It is important to
8Blanchard (2004) referred to this property as a “divine coincidence.”
6Figure 2: The BG response of output and inﬂation to a bubble shock, baseline case
ECONOMIC REVIEW   FOURTH QUARTER 1999 27
Chart 1
EFFECTS OF AN ASSET BUBBLE WHEN MONETARY POLICY RESPONDS
ONLY TO EXPECTED INFLATION
Notes: The panels of the chart show simulated responses of selected variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process in period
zeroequalto1percentofthesteady-statefundamentalprice. Theexanteprobabilitythatthebubblewillburstinanyperiodis 0.5.We
assume a realization in which the bubble bursts in period 5. The solid lines show responses under an aggresive monetary policy,
rE t
n
t t = + 20 1 . . The dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, rE t
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Figure 3: The BG response of output and inﬂation to a bubble shock, with stock price response
ECONOMIC REVIEW   FOURTH QUARTER 1999 29
Chart 2
EFFECTS OF AN ASSET BUBBLE WHEN MONETARY POLICY RESPONDS TO
STOCK PRICES AS WELL AS TO EXPECTED INFLATION
Notes: The panels of the chart show simulated responses of selected variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process, under the
same assumptions as in Chart 1. The solid lines show responses under an aggresive monetary policy,r E s t
n
t tt =+ +   20 01 11 .. . The
dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, r E s t
n
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emphasizethattheseresultsareobtaineddespitethefactthatmonetarypolicyishavingnoeffecton
the bubble itself, which is exogenous: stock prices continue to rise, stimulating spending through
wealth and ﬁnancial accelerator effects. The central bank is able to largely neutralize these effects
with higher interest rates.
Equally striking is the absence of any discernible post-crash fallout. The bursting of the bubble
removes the stimulus, but inﬂicts no collateral damage. Monetary policy then returns to a neutral
policy stance, and the economy goes on as before. The only way to obtain a post-bubble reces-
sion is to assume that positive bubbles are followed by negative bubbles, in which the asset price
falls below the fundamental — but again, these aftereffects are easily combatted by responding
aggressively to expected inﬂation.9
9Theoretical bubble models, like that of Allen & Gorton (1993), often appeal to short-selling constraints to limit
investors’ ability to bet against asset price declines. Since no such constraints exist for stock purchases, the theoretical
basis for negative bubbles is less clear.
7Figure 3 shows what happens when the policy rule includes a response to the stock price.
The performance is demonstrably worse than in the case of no stock price response, especially
when monetary policy is accommodative with respect to inﬂation. Puzzlingly, output falls in the
accommodative case, presumably because policy is overreacting to the bubble and sending the
economy into a recession. Consequently, inﬂation declines sharply in this model simulation.
The logical conclusion is that a direct policy response to asset prices can actually increase
output and inﬂation volatility. This holds even when the bubbles are the only source of asset
price ﬂuctuations. The performance of the policy rule with x > 0 is even worse when asset price
ﬂuctuationsaredrivenbyfundamentalsratherthanbubbleshocks. Apolicyresponsetoassetprices
is wholly counterproductive in this case, with the central bank tightening policy in a misguided
effort to offset favorable technology shocks. The BG quantitative analysis therefore supports the
“benign neglect” prescription: the monetary authority should ignore asset prices, except to the
extent that they affect future inﬂation. Bursting bubbles may be bad for the economy, but they
create no problems that cannot be solved with a few well-timed interest rate cuts.
This rationale for a benign neglect policy is further buttressed by a number of practical con-
cerns. One is the difﬁculty inherent in distinguishing bubbles from fundamentals-driven asset price
ﬂuctuations. Assets’ prices are readily observable, but the fundamentals are not, at least not in real
time. Bernanke (2002) cited Campbell and Shiller’s (1998) bubble warning as an example of how
even the best minds in ﬁnance can get it wrong — or at least sound the alarm prematurely. And
Irving Fisher’s ill-timed 1929 pronouncement that “stock prices are low” is surely the best-known
example of the opposite error.10 Consequently, there will inevitably be mistakes in both directions,
with the central bank sometimes attempting to offset asset price appreciations that are based on
fundamentals, and at other times failing to react to irrational exuberance.
A second problem pointed out by Bernanke (2002), and others, is that it is hard to burst bubbles
safely. Empirical estimates of interest rates’ inﬂuence on asset prices suggest that small interest
rate hikes are unlikely to be effective. Sharp interest rate hikes, on the other hand, run the risk of
causing macroeconomic collateral damage. Indeed, the prevailing view, as articulated in Friedman
10Or was it an error? McGrattan & Prescott (2004) argued that the stock market boom of the late 1920s was in
fact justiﬁed by economic fundamentals. This illustrates the difﬁculty of identifying asset price bubbles, even with 70
years’ worth of hindsight.
8& Schwartz (1963), and others, blames the onset of the Great Depression on the Federal Reserve’s
misguided attempt to pop what it perceived to be a stock price bubble in 1928–29.11 Forty years
earlier, theBankofEngland’sattemptpopaspeculativebubbleattheendof1889itselfprecipitated
a panic, and in the end it did not prevent the Barings crisis a few months later.12 A third issue is
that central bankers are justiﬁably loath to be seen to be (or even perceived to be) passing judgment
on the appropriate level of asset prices.
3 Evolving views of the Bernanke-Gertler prescription
Before the crisis, the question of whether monetary policy should to asset price ﬂuctuations seemed
to have been settled. The BG prescription of focusing exclusively on output and inﬂation forecasts
had become the consensus view, and the policy worked well during the tech boom and bust earlier
in the decade. And ex post, the Fed’s response to the 1987 stock market crash, which focused on
macro and ﬁnancial damage control, has been interpreted as a successful application of the same
policy.
Not surprisingly, the 2007–09 ﬁnancial crisis fractured that consensus, reigniting the long-
standing debate on the appropriate response to asset prices and ﬁnancial conditions more broadly.
Leijonhufvud (2007) argued that central banks’ neglect of asset price inﬂation is dangerous, on
the grounds that expansionary monetary policy can create asset price inﬂation even as prices of
goods and services remain stable. DeGrauwe (2007) concluded that “the subprime crisis shows
that central banks cannot avoid taking responsibilities that include the prevention of bubbles and
the supervision of all institutions that are in the business of creating credit and liquidity.” Giavazzi
& Giovannini (2010) went further, and suggested that IT actually undermined ﬁnancial stability by
creating a “low-interest-rate trap” that encouraged excessive risk taking and increased the likeli-
hood of crises.
At the risk of creating a set of Procrustean rubrics, it is useful to distinguish three ways in
which economists’ views have evolved in response to the crisis. Some maintain is that in spite of
the ﬁnancial crisis, the BG prescription remains fundamentally sound. Others take issue with the
BG ﬁndings narrowly, arguing that a more proactive, “leaning against the wind” policy response to
11Bernanke (2002) includes a compact summary of these views.
12See Kuttner (2010).
9asset prices (and ﬁnancial conditions more broadly) can in fact contribute to macro stability. And
some argue that ﬁnancial stability should be a distinct policy objective, independent of output and
inﬂation.
3.1 The BG prescription is ﬁne as is
One view, articulated by Ito (2010) and Svensson (2010), and others, argues for the retention of
the BG prescription, and the IT framework associated with it. Adherents to this view accept the
key premise that output and inﬂation volatility are the correct objectives, and share BG’s inter-
pretation of bubbles as exogenous demand shocks. They also emphasize the practical objections,
summarized above, concerning the difﬁculty of discerning bubbles and safely deﬂating them.
This is not to say that ﬁnancial stability should not be a policy objective. Instead, those who
argue for retaining the BG prescription argue that monetary policy is the wrong tool for the job, and
that the central bank (or whatever the relevant authority happens to be) should adopt more robust
macroprudential regulatory policies. The availability of a second policy tool solves the Tinbergen
(1952) problem of having more targets than instruments, and allows the monetary authority to
focus exclusively on macroeconomic objectives. The question, as discussed below, is whether an
effective ﬁnancial stability tool is available.
3.2 The BG prescription needs adjustment
A second view is that central banks should adopt a measured “leaning against the wind” strategy
with respect to asset prices, or other measures of ﬁnancial imbalances (e.g., leverage).13 Promi-
nent examples of papers advocating this approach include Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio & Lowe
(2002), Cecchetti et al. (2002), and Bordo & Jeanne (2002). While this view seems not (yet)
to have been adopted by policymakers at the U.S. Federal Reserve, some within the International
Monetary Fund are more open to the idea. In a recent issue of the World Economic Outlook, Fat´ as
et al. (2009) contended that monetary policy should at times take a more active role in countering
ﬁnancial imbalances: “The evidence ...does not support the idea that central banks should react
automatically to changes in asset prices, still less that they should try to determine some appropri-
13A vocal minority, including Roubini (2006) dismissed practical concerns about the detectability of bubbles and
the dangers of trying to pop them, and argue for a much more aggressive policy response to asset prices. Posen (2006)
offered a spirited rejoinder.
10ate level for asset prices. But they should examine what is driving asset price movements and be
prepared to act in response.”
Signiﬁcantly, proponents of this strategy generally do not question the central bank’s objective
of minimizing output and inﬂation volatility, as embodied in equation 1. Instead, their view is that
the best way to further macroeconomic stability involves a systematic response to ﬁnancial imbal-
ances. As noted by Svensson (2010), to the extent that the ultimate objective is output and inﬂation
stabilization, leaning against the wind is perfectly consistent with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. In
this case, asset prices would merely serve as leading indicators of future output and inﬂation, just
as in the BG framework. Crockett (2003), Issing (2003) and Svensson (2010) acknowledged that
the possibility of long-term fallout from a ﬁnancial crisis may call for lengthening the inﬂation
targeting horizon.
Drawing on the model of Kent & Lowe (1997), Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Cecchetti et al.
(2002) made a case for leaning against the wind that represents more of a departure from the
BG framework. Their insight was that if expected future inﬂation were to remain unaffected by
a bubble, which it would if the bubble were not expected to persist very long, then reacting only
to expected inﬂation would fail to prevent bubble-induced macroeconomic volatility.14 Cecchetti
et al. (2000) reported numerical simulations demonstrating that including an asset price term in
the monetary authority’s policy rule can, by offsetting the demand pressures created by unsustain-
able asset price increases, actually reduce inﬂation and output volatility.15 Bernanke & Gertler
(2001) took issue with the Cecchetti et al. (2000) conclusions, however, arguing that their analy-
sis attributed to the monetary authority an unrealistic amount of information on the existence and
duration of the bubble shock.
An important limitation of the BG analysis is that by assuming the asset price bubble to exoge-
nous, it rules out the possibility of monetary policy being able to affect ﬁnancial stability directly.
This necessarily limits the scope of monetary policy to responding to the fallout from asset price
14The same point may also apply to a situation in which the Phillips curve was very ﬂat, or inﬂation expectations
were ﬁrmly anchored by an inﬂation target.
15In a related line of research, Akram et al. (2007) and Akram & Eitrheim (2008) simulated an econometric model
of the Norwegian economy in an effort to assess the performance of monetary policy rules that included asset prices.
They found that responding to debt growth can contribute to ﬁnancial stability, but this is offset by the destabilizing
effects of interest rate volatility. The general conclusion is the advisability of such a policy depends on the source of
the shocks.
11booms and busts, rather than directly going after the source of instability. Relaxing this assump-
tion could therefore justify a more active response to asset prices, for example by using interest
rate hikes to reduce the size of the bubble, and limit the damage caused by its subsequent collapse.
The model of Kent & Lowe (1997) has this feature, and they show that such a policy can, at least
in principle, produce superior outcomes. This reasoning is consistent with that of with Friedman
and Schwartz, who chided the Federal Reserve for following a policy “which was too easy to to
break the speculative boom” in the years prior to 1928.16
Bean (2004) made a similar theoretical point in the context of a New Keynesian model, ex-
tended to include debt-ﬁnanced capital accumulation and credit crunches. In that model, monetary
policy did not affect the probability of a crunch, but it did inﬂuence the buildup of debt via its
effects on the future output gap. Although Bean did not use the model to rationalize a response
to asset prices per se, the model does suggest that that optimal monetary policy should respond
aggressively to expected future output, instead of focusing narrowly on inﬂationary pressures.
Another rationale for pre-emptive rate hikes recognizes the complications created by the zero
lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Robinson & Stone (2006) made this point using a
model in which bubbles stimulated aggregate demand, just as in the BG framework. However they
departed from BG in assuming that the central bank can reduce the expected duration of bubbles by
raising the interest rate, and they also imposed the ZLB constraint on the policy rule. Their insight
was that allowing a bubble to persist and grow increases the likelihood of a bust that would exceed
the central bank’s ability to offset with a non-negative interest rate. Consequently, if monetary
policy can decrease the probability of the bubble’s survival, central banks should react to asset
price booms by raising interest rates, thus insuring against the undesirable ZLB outcome — even
if it means accepting some additional near-term macroeconomic volatility.
3.3 The BG prescription has deeper problems
A third view is that monetary policy should respond to ﬁnancial conditions independently of their
impact on the output gap and inﬂation. Rationalizing such a response requires the plausible as-
16Friedman & Schwartz (1963, p. 290). There is some tension between this diagnosis and their contention that
excessively contractionary monetary policy caused the depression. Their argument is apparently that monetary policy
was too loose before 1928 and too tight thereafter.
12sumption that ﬁnancial instability is costly for reasons other than the volatility it introduces in
inﬂation and the output gap. Several different ways to model these costs have been proposed, all
of which involve resource misallocation and the attendant economic inefﬁciencies.
Bordo & Jeanne (2002) argued that the effects of asset price bubbles, and their collapse, have
effects that go beyond their impact on aggregate demand. Their speciﬁc focus is on the effects of
collateral constraints on the productive sector. In their framework, the reversal of an asset price
bubble is the equivalent of adverse aggregate supply shock. Optimal monetary policy is therefore
not just a matter of aggregate demand management. Instead, the appropriate policy response is to
preempt asset price appreciation up to some point, but to revert to a more accommodative stance
if the perceived probability of an improvement in fundamentals is high. Clearly, operationalizing
such a nonlinear policy rule would present some serious challenges.
Like Bordo & Jeanne (2002), Dupor’s (2002, 2005) model is one in which asset price bubbles
create inefﬁciencies. His framework is one in which ﬁrms are not fully rational, and consequently
mistake the bubble component of asset price movements for ﬂuctuations in the fundamental value
of capital. Bubbles can therefore lead to over-investment, and distort consumption-leisure and
consumption-investment decisions. Monetary policy can be used to offset these distortions by
raising the interest the interest rate when stock prices exceed their fundamental values. Naturally,
this policy prescription requires that the monetary authority can observe stock price fundamentals.








where the W term which captures the welfare losses associated with ﬁnancial crises. Woodford
(2010) sketched a model with a welfare criterion of this form. The model’s distinguishing feature
is that it includes borrowers and savers rather than a single representative agent. Intermediation is
required to equate the two agents’ marginal utilities of consumption. Crisis-induced disruptions
are costly because they create a marginal utility “gap” between the two consumers. The proba-
bility of entering a credit-constrained regime depends on the amount of leverage in the economy,
which is in turn a function of monetary policy. The model’s implication is that optimal policy in-
volves balancing a crisis prevention objective against the conventional goals of output and inﬂation
13stabilization. While this can be interpreted as an extension of the ﬂexible IT framework, it runs
counter to the BG desideratum of responding to ﬁnancial conditions only to the extent that they
affect future output and inﬂation.
Expanding the objective function in this way requires that the central bank use interest rate
policy to manage not only the tradeoff between output and inﬂation, but also more subtle tradeoffs
between ﬁnancial and macroeconomic objectives. Although these objectives may sometimes be
aligned, inevitably instances will arise in which mitigating ﬁnancial distortions will require ac-
cepting more output or inﬂation variability. Benjamin Strong recognized this dilemma when in
1925, pressed to quash rampant stock speculation, asked: “Must we accept parenthood for every
economic development in the country? That is a hard thing for us to do. We would have a large
family of children. Every time one of them misbehaved, we might have to spank them all.”17
Practical challenges abound, and it may be unrealistic to think that central bankers have enough
information to operationalize a policy based in the minimization of equation 2. Unlike inﬂation and
output, there is no clear empirical counterpart to the W that appears in equation 2. Moreover, the
models used to motivate a ﬁnancial term in the objective function differ as the relevant variable.
In Woodford’s framework, leverage is the appropriate variable, but it remains to be seen how a
meaningful aggregate gauge of leverage can be constructed, especially in a ﬁnancial system where
so much leverage is disguised as derivatives and concealed in off-balance-sheet transactions. In the
Dupor and Bordo-Jeanne models, on the other hand, the central bank should respond the deviations
between the market and fundamental stock valuations, raising the perennial question of how such
misalignments might be detected.
Another issue is determining the terms of the tradeoff between inﬂation (or output) and the
likelihood of a crisis is one. Implementing a targeting rule requires an estimate of the likely impact
on W of a one percentage point reduction in the inﬂation rate — or alternatively, how much of a
deviation from the macro objectives would be needed for a given reduction in the probability of a
credit crunch. Also unknown is the magnitude of the impact of the policy interest rate on ﬁnancial
fragility. Conventional econometric methods can be used to estimate of the impact of a 25 basis
point rate hike on real GDP at a given horizon. Estimating the marginal effects of interest rate
17The passage is from a a letter from Strong to New York Fed economist Carl Snyder, May 21, 1925, quoted in
Ahamed (2009, p. 277).
14changes on the likelihood of entering a credit constrained regime is a much more daunting task.
Communicationandaccountabilityarealsoseriousconcerns, particularlyforinﬂationtargeting
central banks. Because inﬂation and output are readily (if imperfectly) measured, it is straightfor-
ward to explain the central bank’s monetary policy decisions in terms of the near-term tradeoffs
between the two. Moreover, the regular release of inﬂation and GDP data make it possible to
hold policymakers accountable, with a modest time lag, for macroeconomic outcomes. It is not
clear how these modes of communication and accountability would apply to a criterion as hard
to measure as expected crisis-induced welfare losses, especially when the “data” on crises appear
irregularly, and at intervals measured in years.
3.4 Two additional considerations
Practical difﬁculties aside, it does not follow from the inclusion of the W term in the objective
function that central banks should use monetary policy as a ﬁnancial stability tool. That case rests
on two additional arguments.
One is that other policy instruments for promoting ﬁnancial stability are either unavailable or
ineffective. If that were not the case, then those tools could be used to address ﬁnancial imbalances,
leaving the monetary authority free to concentrate on macroeconomic objectives. The question of
these tools’ efﬁcacy is well beyond the scope of this paper, but recent experience suggests that
the U.S. ﬁnancial system has evolved in ways that have rendered regulatory measures much less
effective. A great deal of lending takes place by unregulated ﬁnancial institutions like mortgage
brokers, for example. And even those that are nominally subject to prudential regulation have
successfullyusedmechanismslikeSIVsand“repo105”transactionstopartiallycircumventcapital
requirements. The interest rate is the one policy tool that is difﬁcult to evade.
The second argument one would have to make in order to justify a monetary policy response to
ﬁnancial conditions is that such a policy could actually do something to affect ﬁnancial stability.
This could happen in at least four different ways. First, contractionary policy could reduce either
the size or duration of any bubble by restricting the volume of credit supplied. Second, tighter
monetary policy could limit ﬁnancial fragility by decreasing the demand for credit as in Bordo
& Jeanne (2002) and Woodford (2010). Third, if low interest rates lead to excess risk taking, as
allegedbyBorio&Zhu(2008)andGambacorta(2009), thenhigherinterestrateswoulddiscourage
15such risk taking while possibly dampening the bubble. Finally, higher interest rates could directly
offset the sorts of distortions that arise in the Dupor (2002, 2005) model.
These channels’ practical relevance is not well established, however. Part of the reason is that
monetary policy is entirely absent from most bubble models, such as those of Allen & Gorton
(1993) and Scheinkman & Xiong (2003). One that does include an explicit role for the central
bank is Allen & Gale (2000), but it does so via the crude assumption that the central bank directly
controls the supply of credit, up to a random shock realization. The assumption was justiﬁed on the
grounds that the central bank controls the required reserve ratio and the supply of bank reserves,
and these jointly determine the volume of credit available to investors.
While it may have been a reasonable characterization at some point in the past, this view of the
link between monetary policy and credit supply is by now hopelessly dated. With the progressive
reduction of the statutory required reserve ratio, and its further de facto reduction via the introduc-
tion of sweep accounts in the mid-1990s, reserves now constitute less than one percent of bank
credit and deposits, as shown in ﬁgure 4. Of course the level of banking system reserves would
not matter if a reliable link existed between reserves and bank credit. This turns out not to be the
case, however. The solid line in ﬁgure 5 shows the logarithm of the ratio of bank loans to total
reserves, interpretable as the log “loan multiplier,” whose upward trend reﬂects the declining share
of reserves in bank credit plotted in ﬁgure 4. The dotted line shows the residual from the regres-
sion of the logarithm of total loans on a constant, a linear time trend, and the log of total reserves,
which can be interpreted as the error from a cointegration relationship. Standard tests fail to reject
the null of no cointegration, suggesting no stable long-run link exists between reserves and bank
credit.
Moreover, as documented in Friedman & Kuttner (2010), policy rate changes by the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve (and other major central banks as well) require virtually no changes in nonborrowed
reserves, and hence will not meaningfully affect the aggregate size of the banking system’s balance
sheet. And in any case, banks’ and thrifts’ combined share of total credit has declined steadily from
45 percent in 1975 to only 18 percent in 2010. As shown in ﬁgure 6, expressed as a share of GDP
credit extended by institutions not subject to any reserve requirement surpassed lending by banks
and thrifts in the early 1980s. Indeed, very little of the pre-crisis lending boom can be attributed



















Notes: Data are from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 release.
Figure 5: The loan multiplier and the loan-reserves cointegration residual, U.S.

















Notes: Data are from the Federal Reserve’s H.8 release, and author’s calculations.




















Notes: Data are from the Federal Reserve’s Z.1 release. Shaded areas are NBER-
designated recessions.
to lending by traditional intermediaries. The inescapable conclusion is that changes in reserves or
the required reserve ratio now affect only a small part of the ﬁnancial system, and would therefore
be unlikely to have a meaningful effect on credit supply.
4 Can interest rate policy dampen asset price booms?
With conventional monetary policy exerting very little direct inﬂuence over the volume of bank
credit, much less the quantity of total credit, the burden of checking imbalances would presumably
fall entirely on interest rates. Speciﬁcally, interest rates would presumably affect individuals’ and
institutions’ demand for assets and credit, with higher interest rates tending to reduce asset prices
and restraining credit growth.18 This section considers the issue of whether interest rates can either
contribute to or attenuate asset price growth — a critical question if interest rate policy is to be used
to promote ﬁnancial stability.
18This does not necessarily involve deﬂating or puncturing bubbles, of course. Leaving aside the possibility of
bubbles, by shrinking the discount factor applied to future revenues, low interest rates increase the value of long-dated
assets, ceteris paribus, while higher rates decrease those values.
184.1 Existing research
Empirical research on the topic has failed to document a large impact of short-term interest rates
on stock prices, much less any connection to bubbles or crises. Campbell (1991) and Campbell &
Ammer (1993) decomposed the variance of stock prices into components attributable to interest
rates, dividends, and the equity premium, and found that interest rate ﬂuctuations contributed only
three percent of the variance. Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) looked speciﬁcally at the response of
stock prices to unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate. Their main ﬁnding was that a 100
basis point surprise rate increase would lead to a stock market decline of roughly ﬁve percent.19
Thissuggeststhatwhilemonetarypolicydoeshaveaquantitativelymeaningfulimpactonthestock
market, an extended campaign of rate hikes would be required to dampen a sustained, double-digit
increase in equity prices like that experienced in the four years leading up to the crisis.
Given the role played by the real estate market in the 2007–09 crisis, it is not surprising that a
large number of recent papers have sought to document a relationship between interest rates and
property prices. These studies’ ﬁndings are generally inconclusive, however. The Ahearne et al.
(2005) descriptive analysis suggests that low interest rates do tend to precede housing price peaks,
with a lead of approximately one to three years. Using a vector autoregression (VAR) that included
interest rates, credit and money, Goodhart & Hofmann (2008) uncovered a “signiﬁcant multidirec-
tional link” between these variables and property prices, although the direction of causality was
unclear. Focusing more narrowly in the impact of the federal funds rate, Dokko et al. (2009) found
that deviations from the Taylor rule explained only a small portion of the pre-crisis rise in property
prices. Jaroci´ nski & Smets (2008) reached similar conclusions using a Bayesian VAR. Using a
dynamic factor model as an alternative to the VAR method, Del Negro & Otrok (2007) attributed
a relatively small amount of variance to the aggregate national factor, suggesting a small role for
interest rates. And using the Campbell (1991) decomposition, Campbell et al. (2009) found that
interest rate ﬂuctuations contributed very little to changes in real estate prices. Finally, Glaeser
et al. (2010) employed a user-cost model of house prices, and concluded that only a small portion
of the pre-2007 rise in real estate prices was due to low interest rates.
19Similar results were obtained by Rigobon & Sack (2003) and G¨ urkaynak et al. (2005).
194.2 A look the recent pre-crisis experience
Discerning the impact of monetary policy on stock and property prices is not an easy task, in
part because asset prices depend heavily on unobserved factors, such as risk premia and expecta-
tions. Ideally, one would run a randomized controlled trial in which different monetary policies
(or policy rules) were assigned to different central banks, and observe the behavior of asset prices
across countries. Lacking a controlled experiment, a highly imperfect alternative is to look across
countries for a relationship between interest rates and stock and property prices during the period
leading up to their peaks, which in most cases occurred in 2007 or 2008. If monetary policy were
capable of moderating asset price booms, then one would expect to see those countries with higher
short-term interest rates experiencing smaller asset price gains than those with lower interest rates.
To investigate this hypothesis, monthly data on stock prices, short-term policy interest rates,
and consumer prices were obtained for 32 countries from the International Monetary Fund’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics database. The 32 countries included 12 from the euro area, seven
non-euro developed countries, and 13 emerging market economies. Residential property prices
were obtained from the Bank for International Settlements. These data are not consistently col-
lected, however, and usable series were available for only 27 of the 32 countries. Quarterly or
lower frequency data were interpolated to calculate monthly series. Although all are residential
property prices, the speciﬁc coverage (e.g., single-family houses versus ﬂats, new versus existing
dwellings, etc.) varies across countries. The appendix contains additional information on the data.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of annualized real asset price growth over the four years leading
up to the price peak. For equities, this occurred between May and November 2007, depending on
the country. The peak dates for real estate prices were more dispersed: in the U.S. house prices
peaked slightly before stock prices, while elsewhere (e.g., Greece and Italy) the decline did not
commence until the end of 2008.20 Stock price growth ranged from excellent to spectacular over
this period, with all but one of the countries in the sample enjoying real double-digit growth, many
in excess of 20 percent per year. The average for developed economies is 20 percent, and 29
percent for emerging market economies. Property prices generally grew more slowly, averaging
20In several of the European countries, such as Germany, real property prices were essentially ﬂat over this period,
and so the price increase would have been the same regardless of what peak date was chosen.



























































Notes: Stock and consumer price data are from the IMF, property price data are
from the BIS.
ﬁve percent per year in real terms for both sets of countries. Not surprisingly, Iceland holds the
record for real estate exuberance, with an annual real growth rate over four years of 12 percent.
But before investigating the link between monetary policy and asset prices, it is useful to take
a brief detour to characterize monetary policy over this period, and in particular to assess the claim
that central banks were too slow to raise interest rates in the face of rising asset prices. One way
to do this is to estimate an equation to describe the degree to which the countries in the sample
tended to respond to inﬂation, which, as shown in ﬁgure 8, increased slightly over this period. The
regression equation used is
ri = b0+b1pi+b2dem
i +ei (3)
where ri is the short-term nominal interest rate (monetary policy instrument or operational target)
for country i, pi is the inﬂation rate, and dem
i is a dummy variable for emerging market economies.
21The interest and inﬂation rates are the averages for the two years prior to the stock market peak.
Since its members share a common monetary policy, the euro area is treated as a single country,
and the euro-area harmonized CPI is used to calculate the inﬂation rate. Naturally, it would be
dangerous to interpret this equation as structural: over a two-year period, there is surely feedback
from the interest rate to inﬂation, and the equation plainly omits other relevant determinants of the
interest rate, such as the output gap.
The results from estimating equation 3 appear in table 1. Reassuringly, countries with higher
inﬂation tended to set higher nominal interest rates, and taken at face value the inﬂation coefﬁcient
of 2.34 suggests that the reaction is more than two-for-one. However the estimated parameters
are heavily inﬂuenced by Turkey and Brazil, which had much higher inﬂation and interest rates
than the other countries in the sample. Excluding these two observations, the point estimate falls
to a more reasonable 1.34. The coefﬁcient on the emerging market dummy suggests these central
banks set slightly lower interest rates, conditional on a given level of inﬂation, but the difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
One issue with levels regressions like equation 3 is that the neutral interest rate may differ
across countries, implying country-speciﬁc intercepts. One way around this is to look instead at
the change in the interest rate over the year period, and to regress that on the corresponding change
in the inﬂation rate,
Dri = b0+b1rri+b2Dpi+b3dem
i +ei (4)
where rri is the beginning-of-period real interest rate (the nominal rate minus the 12-month lagging
inﬂation rate) and Dpi is the change in the inﬂation rate over the two-year period. The reason for
including the real interest rate is to allow for a kind of error-correction mechanism: a negative
value of b1 would imply that countries with high initial levels of the real rate would reduce the
nominal rate (or raise it more slowly) than those with low initial real rates.
Table 2 displays estimates of equation 4, both including and excluding Turkey and Brazil. With
adjusted R-squareds of 0.388 (0.715 with Turkey and Brazil included), the equation captures the
cross-country pattern of interest rate changes reasonably well. The positive intercept is consistent
with a general trend towards higher interest rates over this period, and central banks raised the
policy rate roughly one-for-one with the inﬂation rate. These patterns are evident in ﬁgure 9, which





























































Notes: Consumer price data are from the IMF.
Table 1: The cross-country relationship between inﬂation and the interest rate
Dependent variable = short-term nominal interest rate
Regressor
Emerging
Intercept Inﬂation market N ¯ R2
Full sample  1:15 2:35  0:30 21 0.468
(0:56) (4:02) (0:14)
Excluding 1:21 1:32  0:70 19 0.374
Turkey & Brazil (1:03) (3:43) (0:62)
Notes: The numbers shown are the estimated coefﬁcients in an OLS regres-
sion of the short-term nominal interest rate on the variables listed during the
two years prior to the peak on the listed variables. Asterisks denote statis-
tical signiﬁcance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%, t-statistics are in
parentheses.





























































Notes: Consumer price and interest rate data are from the IMF.
Table 2: The cross-country relationship between inﬂation and interest rate changes
Dependent variable = short-term nominal interest rate change
Regressor
Lagged Inﬂation Emerging
Intercept real rate change market N ¯ R2
Full sample 1:70  0:19 1:10  0:33 21 0.715
(3:83) (3:55) (4:02) (0:14)
Excluding 1:75  0:22 1:00  0:70 19 0.388
Turkey & Brazil (5:08) (2:21) (3:94) (0:62)
Notes: The numbers shown are the estimated coefﬁcients in an OLS regression of
the change in short-term nominal interest rate on the variables listed during the two
years prior to the peak on the listed variables. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁ-
cance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%, t-statistics are in parentheses.
24depictstheevolutionofrealratesoverthisperiod. Thereisamodestbutpronouncedrightwardshift
in the distribution for developed economies. Although the shift appears smaller for the emerging
market economies, the coefﬁcients on the emerging market dummies are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Together, theresultsintables1and2suggestthatthe21centralbanksinthesamplecollectively
reacted appropriately to gradually rising price pressures in the two years to the crisis — although
with an estimated coefﬁcient on inﬂation equal to or slightly greater than one, one could argue that
they could have responded more aggressively.
Having summarized central banks’ interest rate policies over this period, the next question
is whether these policies made any difference to the behavior of asset prices in their respective
countries. Three alternative regression equations were used to address this question. The ﬁrst
expresses the annualized real percentage change in the asset price Dyi (representing either equities
or real estate) as a function of the average nominal interest rate and the average inﬂation rate during




i +hi : (5)
A second speciﬁcation replaces the levels of the interest and inﬂation rates with their changes,
Dyi = b0+b1Dri+b2Dpi+b3dem
i +b4deu
i +hi : (6)
A third uses as regressors the real interest rate prevailing two years prior to the peak, rri and the
estimated residual from equation 4, ˆ ei, as a gauge of the degree to which (conditional on inﬂation)
monetary policy was tighter or looser than average,
Dyi = b0+b1rri+b2ˆ ei+b3dem
i +b4deu
i +hi : (7)
It goes without saying that these regression equations could provide at best circumstantial evidence
on how monetary policy affects asset prices. For one thing, there would be simultaneous equation
bias if central banks responded to asset price appreciation with higher interest rates. But since
25this would result in a positive correlation between asset price growth and the interest rate, the net
effect would be an upward bias in the (negative) interest rate coefﬁcient(s). Similarly, the level of
economic activity may affect asset prices and the interest rate (via a policy reaction function), but
the regression does not include any variable that would capture this effect. This would also tend to
reduce the likelihood of ﬁnding a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the interest rate.
None of the three equations is at all successful at explaining cross-country patterns in stock
price movements. As shown in table 3, the only statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimates are
the intercepts, and in the speciﬁcation involving the real interest rate (speciﬁcation 3) the coef-
ﬁcients on the emerging market dummies. The adjusted R-squareds are negative for two of the
speciﬁcations, and a paltry 0.04 for the equation involving the interest and inﬂation rate changes
(speciﬁcation 2). In this equation, the coefﬁcients on the interest rate and inﬂation rate changes
have signs (negative for the interest rate, positive for inﬂation) that are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that tighter monetary policy reduces asset price appreciation. Unfortunately, they are not
statistically signiﬁcant, either individually or jointly.
The property price regressions fare slightly better than those for the stock price, but the results
are still quite weak. As shown in table 4, other than the intercepts and those on the dummy
variables, only two of the estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at even the 10 percent
level. The statistically signiﬁcant  1:93 coefﬁcient on the real interest rate in speciﬁcation 3
suggests an inverse relationship between real interest rates and property prices. The quantitative
effect is modest, however, with a one percentage point increase in the real rate reducing the rate of
appreciation by two percentage points. The marginally signiﬁcant  2:82 coefﬁcient on inﬂation in
speciﬁcation 2 goes the other way, however.
Taken together, these rough-and-ready regression results lend little support to the view that
marginal interest rate adjustments can meaningfully dampen asset price bubbles, corroborating the
Reinhart & Reinhart (2011) analysis of the U.S. historical experience. The 21 central banks in the
sample were not collectively “behind the curve” in responding to consumer price inﬂation, and yet
most of the countries experienced spectacular stock price booms and many (though by no means
all) saw sharply rising property prices. The observed cross-country differences in real interest rates
are relatively small, however, and the estimates’ imprecision may be due to the lack of variance
26Table 3: The effect of interest rates on stock prices
Dependent variable = pre-peak annualized stock price gain
Speciﬁcation
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 21:6 21:6 18:1
(4:0) (4:6) (4:2)
Euro area dummy 4:1 5:3 4:9
(0:7) (1:0) (0:9)
Emerging market dummy 9:9 7:1 7:2
(1:7) (1:3) (1:3)
Average interest rate 0:46
2 years pre-peak (0:78)
Average inﬂation  2:15
2 years pre-peak (1:11)
Interest rate change  2:39
from 2 years prior (1:57)
Inﬂation change 4:85
from 2 years prior (1:64)
Real interest rate 0:31
2-4 years pre-peak (0:70)
Interest rate deviation  2:40
from ﬁtted rule (1:08)
Adjusted R-squared  0:016 0:043  0:001
Notes: The numbers shown are the estimated coefﬁcients in an OLS regres-
sion of the annualized percent change in stock prices on the listed variables
during the two years prior to the peak. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁ-
cance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%, t-statistics are in parentheses.
The total number of usable observations is 32.
27Table 4: The effect of interest rates on property prices
Dependent variable = pre-peak annualized property price gain
Speciﬁcation
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 9:2 3:9 8:8
(2:1) (1:3) (3:1)
Euro area dummy  3:7  1:7  5:9
(1:0) (0:5) (1:7)
Emerging market dummy 5:7 9:3 4:9
(1:2) (2:2) (1:4)
Average interest rate  1:03
2 years pre-peak (1:43)
Average inﬂation 0:32
2 years pre-peak (0:23)
Interest rate change 1:26
from 2 years prior (0:93)
Inﬂation change 2:82
from 2 years prior (1:74)
Real interest rate  1:93
2-4 years pre-peak (2:53)
Interest rate deviation 2:28
from ﬁtted rule (1:51)
Adjusted R-squared 0:148 0:178 0:283
Notes: The numbers shown are the estimated coefﬁcients in an OLS re-
gression of the annualized percent change in property prices on the listed
variables during the two years prior to the peak. Asterisks denote statisti-
cal signiﬁcance: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%, t-statistics are in
parentheses. The total number of usable observations is 27.
28in the independent variables. Bolder policy experiments — rate hikes of one or two percentage
points — surely would have been more informative than the incremental adjustments that took
place over this period. The search continues for a deﬁnitive link between interest rates and asset
price bubbles.
5 Conclusions
Two lessons from the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09 are uncontroversial. One is that macroeconomic
stability, and price stability in particular, does not guarantee ﬁnancial stability. The second is that
because the bursting of asset price bubbles can wreak havoc on the real economy, the central bank’s
ﬁnancial stability objective should not be overlooked. The critical question is what, if anything,
monetary policy should do to further that objective.
The Bernanke & Gertler (1999) monetary policy prescription is essentially to treat the symp-
toms of ﬁnancial instability by counteracting the effects of booms and busts on aggregate demand,
rather than attempt to deﬂate the asset price bubbles that create the instability. The conclusion was
based on a macro model with exogenous asset bubbles, and no welfare costs to ﬁnancial instability
other than its effects on output and inﬂation volatility. Model simulations demonstrated that vary-
ing the policy interest rate in response to asset price ﬂuctuations would lead to more more volatile
output and inﬂation, even if the asset price ﬂuctuations were known to be caused by bubbles.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has reopened the question of whether ﬁnancial stability consider-
ations should shape monetary policy. A case can be made for using monetary policy in such a
capacity if it can in fact dampen asset price booms, and if bubbles impose economic costs that are
not entirely reﬂected in output gaps and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. The recent crisis has surely lent sup-
port to the proposition that ﬁnancial crises create signiﬁcant economic inefﬁciencies, such as the
misallocation of resources to the construction of unsold houses, not to mention the costs associated
with litigation and liquidation. These considerations could be used to justify moving away from
the BG prescription and towards a policy intended to attenuate to ﬁnancial booms.
The results reported in this paper (and elsewhere) provide scant empirical support for the ef-
ﬁcacy of modest monetary policy interventions in restraining asset price growth, however. More-
over, such a strategy would present a number of practical difﬁculties. One obstacle is the measure-
ment of ﬁnancial imbalances. Common gauges, such as asset prices and aggregate leverage are
29both imperfect indicators of the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis. A second challenge is communica-
tion: it is not easy to explain why tighter policy is imperative when price inﬂation is subdued. A
third problem is judging the policy’s success, since no amount of leaning against the wind will en-
tirely prevent ﬁnancial crises. Finally, the political economy dimension of the problem should not
be overlooked. Given the disproportionate share of households’ wealth held in the form of home
equity, it would be dangerous for the Federal Reserve to try to dampen property price appreciation.
The mere perception that the Fed was following such a policy would surely give rise to calls to
curtail its independence.
Ultimately, the decision to deviate from the BG prescription may hinge on the availability of
alternative, non-monetarypoliciesfordealingwithﬁnancialsystemrisk. Regulatorymeasures, and
macroprudential regulation in particular, are unquestionably better suited than interest rate policy
to the promotion of ﬁnancial stability. The timidity of the ﬁnancial reforms enacted in the U.S. thus
far is not encouraging, however. Basel III may eventually introduce some macroprudential element
into banking regulation, but its weakness is that it would apply only to banks. Monetary policy
may be the only available tool for dealing with the markets and unregulated ﬁnancial institutions
that were at the epicenter of the 2007–09 crisis in the U.S. Lacking a viable alternative policy tool,
it would not be surprising if some central banks chose to hedge their bets, and give greater weight
to asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy.
30Data appendix
The following table lists the countries included in the analysis, the months during which stock and
property prices peaked, and the coverage and frequency of the property price statistics.
Peak month
Country Stock Property Coverage Freq
Australia Oct 2007 Mar 2008 8 cities Q
Austria May 2007 Sep 2007 X Vienna Q
Belgium May 2007 Sep 2008 Existing dwellings Q
Brazil Dec 2007
Canada Jul 2007 May 2008 Existing dwellings
Chile Oct 2007
Czech Republic Oct 2007 Sep 2008 Existing ﬂats Q
Denmark Oct 2007 Sep 2007 Single family Q
Estonia Jul 2007 Jun 2007 All ﬂats Q
Finland Oct 2007 Jun 2008 Existing dwellings Q
France May 2007 Sep 2008 Existing dwellings M
Germany Jun 2007 Dec 2007 New W. Germany A
Greece Oct 2007 Dec 2008 Urban x Athens Q
Hungary Jul 2007 Jun 2008 Existing Budapest Q
Iceland Jul 2007 Oct 2007 Reykjavik M
Ireland May 2007 Dec 2006 All dwellings Q
Israel Oct 2007 Jul 2007 Owner occupied M
Italy May 2007 Dec 2008 All dwellings H
Korea Oct 2007 Sep 2008 All dwellings M
Mexico Oct 2007
Netherlands Jul 2007 Aug 2008 All dwellings M
New Zealand May 2007 Dec 2007 All dwellings Q
Norway Jul 2007 Jun 2008 All dwellings Q
Poland Jul 2007
Slovak Republic Nov 2007 Jun 2008 Existing dwellings Q
Slovenia Aug 2007 Mar 2008 Existing dwellings Q
Spain Oct 2007 Mar 2008 All dwellings Q
Sweden May 2007 Sep 2008 Owner occupied Q
Switzerland May 2007 May 2007 1-family Q
Turkey Oct 2007
United Kingdom Jun 2007 Aug 2007 All dwellings M
United States Jul 2007 Mar 2007 Existing 1-family
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